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Abstract 
Fibre broadband networks are widely presumed to become the dominant form of fixed-line 
broadband access.  However, the spectre of fibre firms gaining market power, such has been 
evidenced in legacy copper-based telecommunications networks, has led some policy-makers 
to suggest imposing separation mandates (either functional or structural) on the owners of 
fibre networks yet to be built, in order to militate against the creation of a new set of firms 
with market power.  Whilst conceptually separation of the „dark fibre‟ data transportation 
core from network intelligence and retail functions echoes the computer technology-centric 
view of the internet as a „dumb core‟ and an „intelligent fringe‟, and replicates the separation 
mandates  currently  proposed  as  a  means  of  preventing  integrated  legacy  copper-based 
providers from foreclosing retail competition, the ensuing structures likely exacerbate the 
chilling effect of access regulation on network investment observed in most markets where it 
has been applied.   
 
The  chilling  effects  arise  because  of  an  investment  horizon  mismatch  (hold-up)  between 
infrastructure operators with large fixed and sunk costs, and retailers (and arguably even end 
consumers) with freedom to switch between retailers and network infrastructures.  The usual 
resolution to such problems requires customers to make a credible commitment to purchase 
services via relationship-specific investments or contractual commitments. Whereas access 
regulation precludes the contractual resolution of the hold-up problem, separation mandates 
preclude their resolution by consumer-owners vertically integrating upsteam into elements of 
infrastructure ownership. Consequently, it appears unlikely that the level of investment in 
separated fibre networks providing dark fibre connections will be optimal.  Indeed, under 
competitive circumstances and high levels of demand uncertainty, there may be no private 
sector investment forthcoming for dark fibre infrastructures. 
 
By examining the business model of CityLink, a firm that since 1995 has been successfully 
supplying dark fibre in a highly competitive broadband market segment, it is confirmed that 
long-term financial viability of dark fibre-producing firms is feasible when utilising a mix of 
both  contractual  and  asset  ownership  mechanisms  that  bind  end  consumers  into  credible 
commitments  sufficient  to  justify  the  firm‟s  deployment  of  new  network  infrastructure 
capacity.  The institutional arrangements that led to the development of this firm‟s successful 
business model draw their inspiration more from the flexible and collaborative commercial 
interaction  of  the  information  technology  community  rather  than  the  adversarial  and 
prescriptive regulatory environment of the telecommunications industry.  It is concluded that 
if  policy-makers  wish  to  encourage  the  creation  of  a  truly  „dark  fibre-based‟  fixed  line   -3-   
broadband  environment,  then  in  the  initial  stages  of  network  deployment  at  least, 
arrangements similar to those of CityLink are more likely to induce sufficient and timely 
private  sector  investments  than  the  rigid  and  rigorous  separation  and  access  regulation 
arrangements common in the recent history of the telecommunications industry.  
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1.  Introduction 
It  is  generally  presumed  that  ultimately,  due  to  their  superior  transmission  speed 
characteristics, fibre-optic networks will become the dominant technology for the provision of 
fixed-line broadband access
1 (Ida & Sakahira, 2008; Van Gorp & Middleton, 2010).    Whilst 
it is economically feasible for multiple fixed line infrastructure operators to compete in many 
geographic areas (Soria & Hernandez-Gil, 2010; Preissl & Whalley, 2008; Hellwig, 2008), 
undoubtedly there will be some  locations  (e.g. those with low population densities and 
challenging  geography  and  topography)   where  fibre  networks  will  face  little  or  no 
competition (Atkinson, 2008).  The spectre of fibre firms having some market power leads to 
an inevitable question of  what the appropriate regulatory arrangements should be to govern 
the deployment and operation of these new networks (Lebourges, 2010; Amendola & Pupillo, 
2008; Marcus & Elixmann, 2010).   
 
There  has  been  much  debate  about  the  „appropriate‟  regulatory  environment  for  fibre 
broadband markets (Gonçalves & Nascimento, 2010).  The direction of the debate is shaped 
in large part by the historic regulatory instruments applied to the privatised former monopoly 
telecommunications  networks  in  order  to  encourage  the  development  of  competition  in 
liberalising  markets  (Howell,  2007;  2010).    Whilst  across  most  of  the  OECD  access 
regulation
2 has been credited with facilitating the development of services-based competition 
(OECD, 2009; Hellwig, 2008) , there is now a broad agreement that gains from services 
competition and (some, albeit limited) competitor investment on the incumbents‟ networks 
have come at some cost to the incentives for both incumbent firms and their competitors to 
invest in the core of new networks, given the very large fixed and sunk costs required for their 
deployment  (Grajek  &  Roller,  2009;  Huigen  &  Cave,  2008;  Marcus  &  Elixmann,  2008; 
Crandall & Waverman, 2006).  Even where some core investment has been forthcoming (for 
example,  in  the  form  of  fibre-to-the-cabinet  deployments),  it  is  far  from  clear  that  the 
traditional access regulation tools will provide either the appropriate competitive remedies or 
sufficient  incentives to ensure ongoing adequate and efficient investment occurs (Marcus & 
Elixmann, 2008; Gonçalves & Nascimento, 2010).   
 
                                                       
1 For the purposes of this paper, „access‟ is deemed to pertain to the provision of services over the „last mile‟ between a local 
connection node (e.g. roadside cabinet or exchange) and end consumer premises.  This is distinct from the „core‟ of network 
provision that entails the transportation of digital information between local connection nodes (e,g.backhaul and international 
cables).  
2 For example, wholesale price controls and local loop unbundling.    -5-   
1.1  Separated Structures as a Strategic and Regulatory Remedy 
As the nascent fibre broadband networks will be based upon a very different set of network 
architectures from their telecommunications predecessors (internet protocol-based rather than 
circuit-based), it is likely that the institutional structures that best support the delivery of new 
fibre-based  networks  will  differ  substantially  from  those  that  either  emerged,  or  were 
designed to encourage specific behaviours, in the legacy (and relatively mature) copper-based 
telecommunications markets (Gonçalves & Nascimento, 2010; Atkinson, 2008).  Particular 
attention  of  late  has  focused  upon  the  potential  for  some  degree  of  network  element 
separation to be employed as a structural means of constraining the acquisition and exertion 
of  market  power  by  network  operators  (Cave,  2006;  de  Bijl,  2005;  Xavier  &  Ypsilanti, 
2004)
3.  Although initially employed in the United Kingdom as a regulatory tool to constrain 
risks  of  market  foreclosure  in  downstream  retail  operations  by  an  integrated 
telecommunications network operator (as per Rey & Tirole, 2007) (Cadman, 2010), separated 
institutional structures are increasingly seen as a desirable means of giving commercial form 
to the “open systems architecture” on which the internet is considered to be based
4.  Thus, 
they have garnered broad support from both regulators seeking to constrain the exertion of 
telecommunications  firms‟  market  power  and  computer-centric  internet  users  favouring 
networks  where  clear  distinctions  exist  between  the  „dumb‟  central  data  transportation 
component of digital networks and the „intelligent fringe‟ where user-controlled applications 
transform raw data into meaningful information outputs.  
 
Consequently, in some countries policy-makers are already mandating that fibre networks yet 
to be deployed must conform to rigorous ownership and/or functional separation obligations.  
For example, in Australia and New Zealand, substantial government subsidies will be applied 
only to networks where there are clear ownership delineations between retail operations and 
network infrastructure components.  In particular, in New Zealand, any entity with a retail 
operation will be precluded from holding a controlling interest in government-subsidised local 
fibre  companies.  Thus,  existing  infrastructure  owners  with  their  own  retail  operations, 
including  incumbent  copper  network  provider  Telecom  and  cable  provider  TelstraClear, 
would have to structurally separate their existing retail and infrastructure operations if they 
wish to expand into government-subsidised next-generation fibre provision (absent subsidy 
                                                       
3 For example, the European Commission has mandated a form of functional separation of dominant operators as a regulatory 
remedy (European Commission, 2009).  
4  The  “open  systems  architecture”  concept has  evolved  over  time.  The  “Open  Systems  Interconnection  Reference  Model” 
(Zimmerman, 1980) specified the seven-layer reference architecture used by the internet today. Its focus, however, was on 
standards that could be used to allow computers from different manufacturers to communicate. The standards were “open” in the 
sense that manufacturers could freely choose to adopt these standards, and if they did so, could expect their equipment to be 
capable of interconnection with other systems obeying the same standards. The early forerunners of the internet, ARPANET and 
NFSNet were strictly non-commercial and therefore not “open” in the sense that access was restricted. It was only with the 
Scientific  and  Advanced-Technology  Act  of  1992  (42  U.S.C.  §  1862(g))  that  commercial  networks  were  permitted  to 
interconnect with NFSNet, creating the basis for a single, global “open” internet.   -6-   
funding they will be unable to compete by providing their own fibre networks as they will 
face an effectively higher outlay per connection then their government-subsidised rivals)
5.   
 
1.2  Policy Questions for Separated Network Infrastructures  
The imposition of regulated separation mandates on networks yet to be constructed poses two 
very important questions for policy-makers.   
 
1.2.1  Competition Consequences 
The  first  question  relates  to  competition  policy.  What  rationale  supports  the  ex  ante 
imposition of a costly, intrusive, irreversible structural remedy typically used to address a 
specific behaviour associated with firms with extant market power on firms which (Heatley & 
Howell, 2010): 
 (a)   will be supplying an infrastructure that is yet to be even built; 
 (b)   will initially be competing with other firms (often highly regulated because of their 
own market dominance) in the provision of highly substitutable broadband access 
services so will be unlikely to have any degree market power for a reasonable period 
of time; and  
(c)   given both the absence to date of compelling evidence that ultra-fast broadband will 
unconditionally dominate existing broadband products in the wider consumer market 
and the pace of industry technological change in competing technologies (wireless, 
mobile and increasing capacities of both copper and cable connections) may never  
acquire substantial market power?  
 
Whilst in competition law the use of ownership controls to prevent the acquisition of market 
power  is  commonplace  (e.g.  merger  applications)  (Evans  &  Hahn,  2010),  such  remedies 
ought to be applied only following a detailed analysis of the costs and benefits of both the 
separated  and  merged  entities  where  on  balance  the  costs  arising  from  increased  market 
power are demonstrated to exceed the benefits of vertical integration (de Bijl, 2005) – an 
exercise  which  has  been  curiously  absent  from  the  policy  analysis  supporting  the  fibre 
network separation mandates in Australia and New Zealand and indeed the separation policy 
debate generally.  Moreover, such analysis should also take into account the relative costs and 
benefits of utilising the range of other less-intrusive and more easily reversible contractual 
                                                       
5 Whilst TelstraClear has signaled that it will not participate in the government-subsidiesd investment programme, Telecom has 
signaled an intention to structurally separate in the event that it is selected as a partner with the government for this project. 
 http://www.telecom-
media.co.nz/releases_detail.asp?id=3702&page=1&pagesize=10&filtertext=separation&m1=1&y1=1996&m2=8&y2=2010&filt
er=filter    -7-   
instruments  at the disposal of regulators (for example, price and access regulation) in order to 
militate  against  the  exertion  of  market  power  should  it  be  acquired  at  some  future  date 
(Howell, 2009).   
 
1.2.2  Network Cost Structures and Business Case Viability Consequences 
The second question, which  gives rise to the  principal focus of this paper, relates to the 
consequences of separation mandates on the development and viability assessment of the 
business case for both initial investment in, and ongoing maintenance and development of, 
network infrastructures.  Such infrastructures are characterised by their long commercial life-
spans, high levels of fixed and sunk costs, and the necessity for much of the investment to be 
committed long before a single network service can be sold to end consumers.  Typically, the 
marginal cost of such service provision is very small compared to the fixed and sunk cost 
components. This characteristic cost structure leads to two significant investment problems 
for network operators.  Scale economies in production mean such networks typically exhibit 
lower average production costs (are more productively efficient) the larger is the number of 
customers.  Consequently, such networks operate in quite concentrated markets (no more than 
two or three operators is usual). However, as the sunk costs are large, an operator facing such 
a cost structure faces a substantial risk of asset stranding if insufficient connections can be 
sold  at  the  prevailing  market  price.  Under  these  circumstances,  an  investor  considering 
deploying such a network will look for some assurances that the risk of asset standing can be 
either  minimised  or  substantially  compensated  before  committing  to  invest  in  the 
infrastructure.  
 
In respect of legacy telecommunications networks deployed from the late nineteenth century, 
the first investors were generally insulated from asset stranding by government-mandated 
monopoly franchises protecting them from the consequences of competitive entry (Wallsten, 
2006).  Absent competition, the monopoly owner could set prices so as to recover all costs for 
any  given  level  of  demand.  However,  in  the  context  of  twenty-first  century  broadband 
infrastructure markets, liberalisation policies and technological innovation mean that in most 
circumstances, broadband network operators face some form of competition from alternative 
infrastructure operators.  Whilst having some degree of market power (they tend to provide 
differentiated products in markets characterised by monopolistic competition), these firms are 
much more constrained in their ability to set prices than their monopoly predecessors (Carlton 
& Perloff, 2005: 200-20).  In order to recover investment costs and avoid the risk of asset 
stranding under these circumstances, in the absence of any other mechanisms guaranteeing 
cost  recovery  (e.g.  subsidies  or  long-term  pre-purchase  agreements)  investors  in  new   -8-   
networks will generally not enter the market (and indeed, it is economically inefficient for 
them to do so) unless:  
(a)  their  production costs are truly lower than that of the competitors, so that in the event 
of asset stranding it is the competitors and not the entrant that bears the costs; or 
(b) customer  demand  exists  (or  is  reasonably  anticipated  to  exist  in  the  foreseeable 
future) to justify the production of the extra capacity that the new operator brings to 
the market.  
 
Without  such  assurances,  investors  will  (rationally)  abstain  from  committing  to  the 
investment.  Furthermore, existing infrastructure owners also facing similar uncertainties will 
(rationally)  refrain  from  committing  to  capital-intensive  network  upgrades  (including 
substituting  more  capable  fibre  networks  for  less  capable  copper  or  cable  networks).  
Moreover, even, if there truly are potential consumer benefits exceeding the costs of asset 
stranding from network investment (e.g. substantial consumer welfare benefits from highly-
valued capabilities of the new networks not available on the legacy ones), where there is only 
a small number of operators each exposed to very high unrecoverable costs in the case of 
failure, a „prisoner‟s dilemma‟ emerges whereby nobody invests, each operator waiting for 
another to signal that they will take the risk and be the first to invest.   The higher are the 
costs of network investment and the greater is the uncertainty about future  financial viability 
(e.g. the less certain it is that consumers will value the benefits of the new technology highly), 
the more likely it is that such an investment „stand-off‟ will emerge (Evans & Guthrie, 2006).  
The consequence is systemic under-investment and delay in the timing of investment in new 
network capacity – the phenomenon known as investment hold-up where the consumer is 
denied  the  use  of  a  welfare-enhancing  technology  because  the  producer  lacks  sufficient 
certainty  that  the  returns  from  the  investment  that  leads  to  the  technology  being  made 
available will be sufficient to justify its deployment (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985).   
 
Assuming that there are substantial consumer benefits to be gained from the investment in 
new (or additional) network capacity, the classical resolution to the „hold-up‟ problem is 
either  a  contractual  arrangement  that  shares  the  risk  of  asset  stranding  across  both  the 
producer and consumers (e.g. the consumer makes an enforceable „credible commitment‟ to 
purchase a quantity at a price that ensures adequate compensation to the producer) (Milgrom 
& Roberts, 1992) or an ownership arrangement – that is, vertical integration (Hansmann, 
1996). In the specific case of telecommunications networks, consumer(s) who would benefit 
from the technology being made available may „internalise the hold-up risk‟ by owning the 
infrastructure themselves under the aegis of a consumer-owned entity (e.g. a consumer co-
operative)  (Howell  &  Sangekar,  2009).    However,  if  the  consumer  benefits  are  low  or   -9-   
uncertain, it is unlikely that individual consumers will commit to contracts that lock them in 
to  costly  long-term  arrangements,  due  to  the  risk  of  wasting  the  committed  resources.  
Likewise, if only a small number of consumers value the benefits of the new networks highly 
enough, the funds that they are prepared to contribute (up to their own individual benefits 
from having network access) will be insufficient to deploy the desired network infrastructure.  
The consumer ownership solution will not emerge endogenously either, as even under these 
arrangements where consumer demand uncertainty is largely internalised, the risks of asset 
stranding are too high.  
 
1.2.3  Regulatory Risks and Asset Stranding 
It  has  already  been  demonstrated  both  theoretically  and  empirically
6  that  widespread 
application of  access regulation as a means of increa sing competitive pressure on former 
monopoly  infrastructure  owners  has  resulted  in  i ncreased  uncertainty  for  investors 
committing funds to the construction of new and u pgraded broadband infrastructure.  This 
occurs because regulators cannot easily „look forward‟ to accurately assess the risks of asset 
stranding  when  setting  cost-based  access  prices, so  regulated access prices  are  extremely 
unlikely to induce the efficient level of investment, even in the cases where regulators have 
overtly considered possibility of stranding in their price-setting practice (Hausman & Sidak, 
2005; Guthrie, 2006).  Regulatory arrangements that result in an allocation of hold-up risk 
between  producers  and  consumers  that  interferes  with  the  incentives  to  invest,  whilst 
simultaneously limiting the options available to the parties to come to mutually acceptable 
agreements that reassign the risks in a manner more conducive to addressing the investment 
hold-up problem risks, therefore exacerbate the likelihood that investors will abstain from 
building new networks.  To the extent that separation regulations impose an additional layer 
of  ownership  and  contractual  restrictions  on  infrastructure  owners  over  and  above  the 
restrictions  imposed  by  access  regulation,  it  must  be  questioned  whether  the  additional 
separation  obligations  ameliorate  or  exacerbate  the  investment  holdup  problems  already 
identified as problematic as a consequence of the widespread application of access regulation.   
 
1.3  The Business Case Consequences of Separation Mandates 
To that end, the balance of this paper examines the implications of separation mandates upon 
investment incentives for nascent fibre broadband infrastructures.  Section  2 explores the 
architecture of fibre broadband networks and the ways in which generic separation models 
map the technological features of network provision onto the (separate) institutions investing 
                                                       
6 For a literature review, see Grajek & Roller (2009).   -10-   
in each component of network service delivery.   Section 3 then identifies how the investment 
hold-up risks are allocated across the various (separated) institutions.  Drawing extensively 
upon Howell, Meade & O‟Connor (2010), this section finds that separation mandates actively 
militate against optimal sharing of the costs and risks of asset stranding across all market 
participants.    In  addition  to  the  restrictions  on  contractual  resolution  imposed  by  access 
regulation,  separation  mandates  also  lock  out  the  possibility  of  the  utilising  ownership 
solutions  (e.g.  infrastructure  owners  integrating  downstream  into  retail  operations  or  end 
consumers  integrating  upstream  into  infrastructure  ownership)  to  address  the  question  of 
hold-up risk allocation. 
 
Given the problems for the generation of optimal investment incentives posed by separation, 
Section 4 then poses the question of whether it might ever be possible for a business case to 
be developed that supports the commercially viable provision of an institutionally separate 
„dumb‟ („dark fibre‟) internet core by any single institution.   This section utilises the theory 
explored in the preceding sections via an illustrative case study of the New Zealand firm 
CityLink, which has been commercially successful as a supplier of dark fibre in Wellington 
since 1995.  The case study shows that CityLink has been supplying its services in direct 
competition with both copper and cable broadband suppliers since 1999, and has increased 
the range of its network coverage substantially even in the face of aggressive competition 
from alternative suppliers.   CityLink only lays fibre when it has established that there is an 
end customer who is willing to buy dark fibre services from the firm for a period of time that 
enables the recovery of fixed and sunk costs.  CityLink‟s successful business model relies 
upon the credible commitment made by end consumers who vertically integrate upstream into 
elements of infrastructure ownership, and intermediaries who make credible commitments by 
investing in their own infrastructure, and bind their customers into longer-term contracts that 
reduce  the  likelihood  of  asset  stranding  occurring.    The  key  mechanism  employed  is  a 
relationship-specific customer investment (either in assets or contracts) whereby the customer 
shares in the costs of asset stranding should a decision be made subsequently to defect to a 
rival  infrastructure  provider.    With  this  alignment  of  incentives,  CityLink  is  reasonably 
assured of being able to price its services so as to recover its fixed and sunk costs, so is 
shielded  from the risks of asset stranding.    
 
The paper concludes with the observation that by failing to address the risks of asset stranding 
inherent in the construction of new fibre broadband networks, structural separation mandates 
on  fibre  network  providers  will  likely  exacerbate  the  chilling  of  investment  incentives 
observed under access regulation.  However, by adopting an approach that encourages end 
consumers  individually  making  some  credible  commitments  to  purchase  services  from   -11-   
specific providers (e.g. investments in specific assets or engaging in extended contractual 
commitments to purchase services for an extended period of time), some serious limitations 
upon  the  ability  for  network  investors  to  recover  their  costs  under  structural  separation 
mandates will be addressed.   
 
2.  Institutional Separation Mandates and an ‘Open Internet’ 
Generic  separation  models  for  „open  end-to-end‟  internet  infrastructures  identify  three 
„layers‟ within the supply and distribution of fibre (and other data communications) networks: 
Layer  1,  or  the  „physical  layer‟,  which  provides  the  dark  fibre  connection  between  the 
customer premises and a local aggregation node (akin to copper connections under local loop 
unbundling); Layer 2, or the „data link layer‟, whereby dark fibre links are converted into 
bitstream connections over which internet traffic can be passed (akin to wholesale services 
offered by incumbent telecommunications companies, and by unbundling entrants using their 
own equipment in incumbents‟ facilities); and Layer 3 or „network layer‟ services whereby 
retailers (for example, internet service providers - ISPs) offer cross-network communication 
and data access plans to consumers.  
 
As typically over 90 percent of the fixed costs of network provision attend to the supply of 
Layer 1 and 2 components (of which at least 70 percent pertain to Layer 1 costs), it is in their 
provision that issues of market power as a consequence of cost structure are likely to arise.  
To enable the development of competition in the provision of Layer 3, and to a lesser extent 
Layer  2,  services,  separation  proponents  advocate  either  the  prohibition  of  common 
ownership of the firms supplying services at  each of the three different layers (structural 
separation)  or the less rigorous „functional  separation‟,  where  the  same  firm  may  supply 
services at multiple layers, but with the services crossing the boundaries between layers being 
supplied  to  all  customers  (including  the  proprietary  downstream  firm(s))  at  identical 
„equivalence of inputs‟ terms (Heatley & Howell, 2010).   
 
Under structural or functional separation arrangements, two impediments to the creation of 
competitive  Layer  3  markets  („services  competition‟)  –  denial  of  access  to  „bottleneck‟ 
essential infrastructures (or monopoly pricing for such acquisition); and the risk of strategic 
foreclosure in Layer 3 markets by Layer 1 and Layer 2 operators with market power – are 
simultaneously resolved. Furthermore, if separation is mandated between Layers 1 and 2, then 
the tool in effect replicates the effects of local loop unbundling, by introducing competition 
into the provision of those components of network  infrastructure provision  (i.e. Layer 2) 
which,  although  themselves  embodying  some  scale  economies,  are  more  conducive  to   -12-   
efficient duplication than the underlying Layer 1 infrastructures.  In these respects, separation 
can be viewed as a substitute for historic access regulation (Xavier & Ypsilanti, 2004).  
 
Moreover, the concept of „open‟, „non-discriminatory‟ access under equal terms to all access 
seekers, and in particular the separate provision of Layer 1 „dark fibre‟ services, conforms to 
the  aspirational  principles  espoused  by  the  internet‟s  originators  of  a  „dumb‟  core 
transportation utility (Layer 1), with „intelligent‟ processing capabilities turning transported 
bits  into  useful  information  operating  at  the  „edges‟  (Economides,  2008).      As  core 
information transportation capabilities provided  by legacy telecommunications firms become 
more internet protocol-centric, it has become both more feasible and more popular for the 
commercial models for the provision of mass market core internet infrastructure services to be 
equated  with  the  provision  of  ethernet-based  „dark  fibre‟  services  within  firms  or 
contractually-aligned entities (private networks).  On one level, the supply of copper can be 
viewed as a functional equivalent to the supply of connections to an ethernet segment.  The 
supply of the physical infrastructure can be separated from all „intelligent processing‟ of the 
information transported on that infrastructure.  Structural and/or functional separation of the 
copper loops from all processing echoes the within-network separation of the provision of 
core network services from the provision and maintenance of applications on that network.  
As  network  provision  services  are  typically  institutionally  separate  from  application 
management within a given firm or collaborative network, the separation models currently 
attracting interest within the telecommunications regulation policy environment are already 
very familiar in a structural sense within the computer-centric user environment.   
 
A clear distinction, however, exists between the business models supporting the operation of 
each infrastructure type.  Within a single firm or collaborative network, there is usually some 
degree of ownership internalisation linking end users and the core network.  The deployment 
of additional core capacity is driven directly by information derived from „internal‟ end users 
of their likely anticipated future use.  Future demand is thus reasonably certain, reducing the 
risks  of  asset  stranding.    Furthermore,  internal  corporate  requirements  can  specify  which 
networks must be used by specific end users for a given task, limiting the risks that users will 
defect  to  the  use  of  services  provided  by  a  competing  firm
7.  This is a very different 
institutional arrangement from that of a „public network‟ provider, who faces the vaguaries of 
both  future  demand  for  services  and  competition  from  alternative  network  providers.  
Whereas the common ownership and internal usage edicts result in the risks of asset standing 
                                                       
7 For example, the initial internet arrangements in New Zealand were predicated upon a collaborative model amongst a number 
of universities.  One university (Waikato) took the lead buy investing in core network infrastructure, but supported by a pre-
agreed charging arrangement whereby all other universities agreed to contribute towards the costs, regardless of the amount of 
use each may have made of the infrastructure (Brownlee, 1998).    -13-   
and hold-up being minimised by their „internalisation‟ within the institution, for a public 
network faced with separation mandates, the possibility of reducing the size of these risks by 
either ownership or functional integration is negated.  The structural similarities thus do not 
translate neatly into equivalent viable business models, as the different allocation of hold-up 
risks alters their respective financial viability. 
 
3.  ‘Hold-Up’ Risk in ‘Separated’ Network Models 
Howell,  Meade  &  O‟Connor  (2010),  drawing  upon  Meade  &  O‟Connor  (2009),  Meade 
(2010) and Howell (2009), demonstrate that the requirement for separation of Layer 1 and 2 
network infrastructures from Layer 3 retail operations leads to increased risks of investment 
hold-up, relative to the counterfactual of an integrated firm.  The higher risks result from two 
factors – risk of bypass by a competing infrastructure, and loss of information to co-ordinate 
investment and usage plans.  
 
3.1  Risks from Infrastructure Bypass Increased by Separation 
The  risks  arising  from  separation  increase  the  greater  is  the  likelihood  that  a  bypass 
technology could be deployed.  It is noted that one of the purposes of separation was to 
preclude foreclosure by an integrated firm of Layer 3 competitive entry.  Separation increases 
the likelihood of increased competition at Layer 3 relative to the case of vertical integration, 
even in the presence of access regulation. Many contractual relationships, each of which is 
subject  to  a  risk  of  hold-up,  now  replace  the  single,  internalised  transaction  within  the 
integrated firm.  Each Layer 3 retailer can now make independent decisions regarding the 
purchase of infrastructure services, increasing the uncertainty that the infrastructure owner 
faces regarding future demand.   
 
A separate Layer 3 retailer buying underlying network services period-by-period at averaged 
(e.g. regulated LRIC) prices faces negligible fixed and sunk costs, so can therefore enter and 
exit from the industry relatively costlessly.  Indeed, the entire purpose of access regulation 
(and by derivation, separation) is to make entry for these competitors as low-cost as possible 
by freeing them from the obligation to sink any costs in the first place, as it is the sinking of 
the costs that leads to the problem of market power.  However, the infrastructure operator 
faces  exit  costs  in  respect  of  any  unrecovered  fixed  and  sunk  costs.    This  leads  to  an 
investment  horizon  mismatch  between  the  (short-term  focused)  Layer  3  retailers  and  the 
(long-term focused) infrastructure operator.  In order to justify investing in the infrastructure, 
the  infrastructure  operator  requires  some  assurances  that  Layer  3  retailers  will  purchase   -14-   
services over a sufficiently long period of time to enable fixed and sunk costs to be recovered.   
In effect, the infrastructure owner requires the same form of „credible commitment‟ that the 
retailers will continue to purchase services for the lifetime of the investment that its own retail 
arm would have provided had it been allowed to own one (as per Williamson, 1985).  
 
Whilst  in  principle  any  Layer  3  retailer  could  enter  into  a  long  term  contract  with  the 
infrastructure operator for the supply of services, the likelihood that such an agreement would 
be entered into willingly decreases the more likely it is that either another competing Layer 3 
operator can subsequently obtain a more advantageous deal from the infrastructure operator 
thereby leading to a loss of customers by the first operator, or that a competing infrastructure 
provider will offer services to the Layer 3 operator at more advantageous terms than offered 
by the original network operator.  Although the consequences of the first scenario are neutral 
for a monopoly infrastructure operator, insofar as the end consumer remains a customer of the 
same network, albeit serviced by a different retailer, the consequences of the second scenario 
threaten the financial viability of the investment in the core network.  Without any reasonable 
certainty that the Layer 3 retailers will continue to purchase services (i.e. they are not „locked 
in‟ to the original network – there is no „credible commitment‟ to purchase), the infrastructure 
operator faces greater risks to its ability to recover its costs than under full integration where 
it  manages  its  own  retail  customer  contracts  (including  minimum  connection  periods).  
Network  investment  under  the  separation  scenario  is  thus  more  costly  (risky),  leading  to 
either delayed or foregone network construction.  The „natural‟ resolution to the increased 
contractual uncertainties in a separated environment would be for the network operator to 
reduce risks by vertically integrating downstream into retail operations – the very „solution‟ 
that is precluded by separation mandates.   
 
Howell, Meade & O‟Connor (2010) also note that mandatory separation is likely to induce 
investment in bypass technologies earlier than would be socially efficient, simply because the 
separate Layer 3 retailers can defect costlessly to the new network, whereas an incumbent 
(vertically integrated) operator can use retail contracts to lock in its end customers until the 
relevant  fixed  and  sunk  costs  have  been  recovered,  thereby  ensuring  more  efficient 
application of scarce investment capital.  Whilst on the one hand, contracts locking retail 
customers  in  for  extended  periods  of  time  might  be  perceived  to  be  an  anti-competitive 
practice, on the other hand they are desirable if they avoid the socially wasteful costs of asset 
duplication and stranding.  Indeed, the purpose of regulatory protection from competition for 
networks with high fixed and sunk costs (as occurred in the early days of deployment of 
telecommunications networks) was specifically in order to provide sufficient incentives to   -15-   
induce investment in the infrastructure in the first place by reducing the risks of both asset 
stranding and socially wasteful duplication of infrastructure.   
 
3.2  Separation Exacerbates Information Quality Uncertainty Risks 
Howell, Meade & O‟Connor (2010) also demonstrate that, under conditions of monopolistic 
competition, the investment horizon mismatch will lead to „too much‟ competition occurring 
in the Layer 3 retail market.  As each entrant will likely fail to take account of the effect of 
their  own  entry  on  the  residual  demand  curve  when  making  their  entry  decision,  more 
operators than is efficient will enter. Over-entry results in systemic overestimation of the 
likely demand for underlying network services.  Furthermore, as none of the entrants faces 
any of the costs of sunk and stranded assets arising from their demand overestimates, and in 
order to receive favourable regulated access prices, they face strong incentives to even further 
exaggerate likely future demands.  If the separated infrastructure operator is bound to invest 
to deliver according to Layer 3 demand projections, then if the infrastructure investor does not 
anticipate this consequence, there is a possibility that separation may also lead to inefficient 
over-investment and even higher risks of asset stranding if demand does not materialize.  If 
the  investor  does  anticipate  the  consequence,  then  it  becomes  even  more  likely  that  no 
investor will build the network, leading to the classic „missing market‟ for investment. In 
either case, the outcome deviates from the optimal investment strategy, and likely an inferior 
outcome to the counterfactual of investment by an integrated, (e.g. rate-of-return) regulated 
firm. 
 
Once again, the „natural‟ economic resolution to the information quality problem is to require 
that  the  (separated)  Layer  3  retailer  be  made  to  carry  some  of  the  risks  associated  with 
exaggerated  forecasts.    This  can  be  achieved  by  „locking  in‟  the  retailer  to  a  long-term 
contract – for example, binding the retailer to purchase the demanded services for an extended 
period of time, thereby sharing some of the risks of ownership that the forecasts engender.  
However,  the  more  rigid  are  such  contractual  requirement  the  more  like  an  ownership 
arrangement they become, and the less likely it is that the optimal level of competition in the 
provision of Layer 3 services develops.  The tautology of using regulation to preclude the 
utilisation of „natural‟ ownership solutions deriving from the specific cost structures in the 
industry concerned, and then imposing further regulatory obligations in order to recreate the 
effects of ownership to restore investment incentives becomes immediately obvious
8.   
                                                       
8 It also begs the question of whether, when there is competition from underlying infrastructures, a „second best‟ outcome might 
be achieved by allowing competition directly between fully vertically integrated infrastructure firms – as is common in mobile 
telephony markets where different integrated network operators compete at the  retail level with virtual operators purchasing their 
upstream network services under wholesale arrangements.    -16-   
3.3  Consequences and Cautions  
This line of thinking leads directly to the conclusion that mandating separation is likely to be 
most costly (and problematic) the greater is the extent of competition (both in infrastructure 
and services).  Whilst any instrument aimed at increasing retail competition increases the 
risks of investment hold-up from bypass and lower information quality outcomes, the most 
prescient risk for separated fibre networks arises when the separated network infrastructure 
owner faces real or impending competition from both existing copper and cable networks and 
(in some markets at least) ongoing improvements to the capabilities of cellular and wireless 
networks.  Under these circumstances, Layer 3 operators will be least likely to be willing to 
enter into long term contracts today, lest either they or their competitors can get a better deal 
tomorrow from an alternate infrastructure provider.   
 
De Bijl (2005) cautions strongly against the use of separation in legacy networks where there 
is any possibility of infrastructure competition emerging.  However, the Howell, Meade & 
O‟Connor (2010) findings suggest that separation is also inconsistent with the alignment of 
investment interests in the case of new networks.  By definition, absent any other industry 
distortions (such as the proposal in Australia where the government has negotiated to buy 
Telstra copper assets to preclude competition with the new government-funded fibre network 
– Heatley & Howell, 2010), new fibre broadband networks will be deployed into markets 
where they face extant infrastructure competition from at the very least incumbent copper 
networks, but also quite possibly also from cable broadband providers.    
 
Absent both a range of compelling applications that cannot operate satisfactorily on any other 
technology  and  any  clear  evidence  that  consumers  are  willing  to  pay  substantial  price 
premiums  for  fibre  connections  in  order  to  access  these  applications  (Howell  &  Grimes, 
2010),  from  the  perspective  of  end  consumers  there  may  be  a  very  large  degree  of 
substitutability  between  fibre  and  legacy  broadband  connections  (Ida  &  Sakahira,  2008). 
Without its own retail operation, the infrastructure operator cannot manage the substitution of 
end customers from their existing infrastructure to fibre. There is always a risk that even 
when a Layer 3 retailer has connected its customers to the fibre network, the operator will get 
a  „better  deal‟  from  another  infrastructure  provider  to  switch  technology-agnostic  end 
consumers  away  again.    Under  these  circumstances,  imposing  separation  mandates  even 
before there is any investment in fibre infrastructure will automatically raise risks and costs, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of fibre investment being delayed or held up, relative to the 
counterfactual of a vertically integrated fibre operator.  
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4.  Dark Fibre Provision by CityLink 
Taken to its conclusion, the reasoning of the preceding section leads to the question of why 
separation – a structural remedy used to militate against existing market power – should ever 
be applied in the case of a network infrastructure that yet to exhibit a market presence, let 
alone a position of market power.  Whilst there may be some merit in its use in mature 
networks, to require separation of a network where there is yet to be any investment would 
appear to invoke the near certain result of a „missing market for investment‟ in the Layer 1 
and 2 infrastructures, unless there was such a large pent-up demand for the new technology 
that the risks of asset stranding were negligible.   
 
Specifically, the findings suggest that, absent any other form of intervention (e.g. government 
subsidies), it would be extremely unlikely that investment in Layer 1 „dark fibre‟ networks 
providing underlying services for „public‟ broadband access would emerge endogenously.  
The likelihood of such a network emerging in a highly technologically volatile environment 
where existing infrastructure providers were supplying competing (close substitute) services 
seems even lower.  Yet it appears that this is  precisely what has occurred in Wellington, New 
Zealand, where CityLink has been providing dark fibre services since 1995. 
 
4.1  CityLink - Background 
CityLink was formed in 1995 as a consequence of a Wellington City Council policy initiative 
to deploy an advanced, low-cost communications network to local business and government 
enterprises
9.  The firm  had its origins in  an internal Wellington City Council information 
network linking various council departments around the city. When Council bylaws were 
changed in 1995 to enable the use of the council-owned trolley bus wires and power poles for 
the provision of public-access infrastructures, the council‟s information technology manager 
and sixteen other shareholders contributing capital of only $85,000 formed CityLink, with the 
objective of providing a „neutral‟ “open access infrastructure available to service providers 
and users alike”
10.   The firm provides a simple „dark fibre‟ (Layer 1) service.  Partner firms 
provide Layer 2 and 3 services
11.  End customers (predominantly businesses, although there is 
a small base of residential consumers) can choose to either provide the Layer 2 s ervices 
themselves or buy services at either Layer 2 or above from the partner firms.   
                                                       
9 For further information, see CityLink‟s Digital Revolutionaries – available on http://www.citylink.co.nz/about/FibreCITY.pdf  
10 http://www.citylink.co.nz/about/background.html  
11 For a list of partner firms, see http://citylink.co.nz/channel-partners/isp-list.html .   -18-   
 
The desire to provide an open access network was in part to differentiate the firm‟s services 
(derived  from  its  computer  service  infrastructure  origins)  from  the traditional „telephony-
based‟ leased line services offered by rivals Telecom and Clear (subsequently TelstraClear).  
At the time, the company was aided in part by the prevailing central government‟s „light-
handed‟ competition law-based governance of the telecommunications industry, which placed 
no regulatory barriers in the way of firms entering the market to compete with the incumbent 
(Howell, 2007).  In the past fifteen years, the firm has grown from a small capital city CBD-
based provider to one supplying services in Auckland in addition to inner-city suburbs and 
some at much further distances in the Wellington region.  Its customers include some of New 
Zealand‟s  most  information–intensive  businesses  and  government  departments  (including 
Victoria  University,  the  Bank  of  New  Zealand,  the  country‟s  dominant  internet  trading 
platform  TradeMe  and  the  film  industry‟s  Oscar-winning  Weta  Workshop).  It  has  also 
expanded out into the provision of server hosting, public and private LAN services, backhaul 
provision, security services and WiFi connections.  In many of these, it competes directly 
with its partner firms.  However, the core of the business remains the provision of its dark 
fibre connections.   
 
4.2  The ‘Exception that Proves the Rule’? 
The startling feature of CityLink‟s growth is that it has been funded entirely from private 
investment and has been achieved in New Zealand‟s most intensely competitive geographical 
markets for such service provision.  In the Wellington market, CityLink has faced traditional 
telecommunications-based  broadband  competition  from  Telecom  and  TelstraClear,  cable 
broadband competition from Saturn (subsequently acquired by TelstraClear), internal service 
provision  by  large,  integrated  government  departments  and  state-owned  enterprises,  and 
increasingly  competition  from  wireless  provider  Woosh  and  mobile  operators  Telecom 
Mobile, Vodafone and 2 Degrees.    
 
From the preceding discussion, the odds against CityLink succeeding commercially from the 
provision of dark fibre (leaving to one side the Layer 2 and higher services provided, as they 
contribute a proportionately smaller share of revenue streams) are substantial.  Yet succeed it 
has.  On closer examination, however, it becomes clear that, despite its objectives of open 
network provision, the reasons for CityLink‟s success rely very strongly upon a business 
model derived much more closely from the collaborative contractual relationships (and their 
attendant  ethos  of  partnership  and  long-term,  commitment)  that  have  characterised  the 
investment  in  and  deployment  of  proprietary  computer  networks  than  the  principles  of   -19-   
regulated open access (and attendant reduction in the costs of (residential and commercial) 
customer  commitment  and  lock-in)  that  have  characterised    the  liberalisation  of  former 
monopoly telecommunications networks.   
 
4.2.1  CityLink’s Business Model Specifically Addresses Hold-Up Risk 
The  first  significant  observation  is  that  CityLink,  unlike  regulated  telecommunications 
providers, is not obligated to provide services to all potential customers who might seek to 
buy from it.  It is free to „pick and choose‟ with whom it deals.  Second, it does not have to 
provide  a  standardised‟  one  size  fits  all‟  regulated,  homogeneous  product  to  all  of  its  
customers.  It is free to customise services for each customer, whether that customer is one of 
its partner firms or an end user.  Thus, unlike a separate, dark fibre firm as envisaged under 
telecommunications  regulatory  regimes,  there  is  an  ability  to  integrate  downstream  into 
services required for one customer at terms that can be agreed uniquely with that customer, 
without facing the obligation to supply the same services on identical terms to any other 
customer who might subsequently seek access to that service.   
 
There  are also substantial differences in CityLink‟s business model that enable it to address 
the risks of hold-up and asset stranding that attend the classic telecommunications separation 
models for dark fibre firms.  Specifically, CityLink has minimised its risk of asset stranding 
by  undertaking  its  investment  in  new  network  capacity  (for  example,  a  spur  into  a  new 
suburb, such as the recent expansion into the distant Wellington suburbs of Miramar and 
Petone) only when it has located an „anchor customer‟ from whom it has received reasonable 
(credible) assurances that a defection to a competing infrastructure provider will not occur 
until CityLink has been able to recover in revenues the fixed and sunk costs of deploying the 
infrastructure.   
 
In the case of an end consumer purchasing dark fibre services, the assurance usually takes the 
form of investment by that consumer in relationship-specific assets (housing and electrical 
facilities, plus the specific technology required to transform the dark fibre services into useful 
information services that the customer can then utilise).  As the customer‟s assets are „co-
partnered‟ (in economic terms „specific‟) to the provision of CityLink‟s dark fibre service, 
they will become stranded if the customer defects to another infrastructure provider.  The 
larger is the size of the investment the customer makes in the relationship, the greater is the 
assurance  to  Citylink  that  the  customer  will  not  defect  to  another  infrastructure  provider 
before the costs of Citylink‟s investment have been recovered.  The customer and CityLink 
now share the risks of CityLink‟s assets becoming stranded, to the extent that CityLink now 
finds it worthwhile making the Layer 1 investment.  Likewise, CityLink‟s investment in the   -20-   
fibre to the premises and the need to recover a return on it provides mutual assurance to the 
Layer 2 investor that CityLink will not withdraw dark fibre services leaving the Layer 2 
investor with stranded assets.  In essence, the credible commitment has been achieved by the 
end consumer „vertically integrating‟ (either by ownership or contractual alliance) upstream 
into the ownership of Layer 2 infrastructure, and assuming some risks of asset stranding that 
better align its investment horizon with that of the Layer 1 operator.  
 
By  comparison,  under  three-way  separation  mandates,  the  end  consumer  faces  negligible 
costs of fibre asset stranding at all from the choice to switch infrastructures.  The losses to the 
Layer 3 retailer from consumer defection are also very small.  Under such arrangements, the 
Layer 1 dark fibre provider contracts with a Layer 2 provider, who also bears a risk of asset 
stranding if Layer 3 retailers defect to alternative infrastructure providers.  In the CityLink 
case, the Layer 2 partner (and to a lesser extent, Layer 3 partner) providers must address the 
risks of being left with their own stranded assets in relation to Layer 1 fibre laid by CityLink 
to  an  end  consumer‟s  premises.    The  ultimate  contractual  relationship  becomes  one  of 
„partnership‟ between all of the end consumer, Layer 3 and 2 providers, and CityLink.  Whilst 
CityLink receives assurances that defection will not occur from the Layer 2 provider due to 
the sunk investment commitment at that layer, the Layer 2 provider must also have some 
credible  assurances  from  the  Layer  3  provider,  and  the  Layer  3  provider  from  the  end 
consumer, that defection will not occur.  As there is little capital required at the Layer 3-
consumer and Layer 3-Layer 2 levels, these assurances are typically in the form of agreed 
fixed-term  commitments  to  purchase  services.    For  example,  a  building  owner  (Layer  3 
equivalent) may contractually agree with a Layer 2 provider to purchase services for a defined 
period.  The building owner then makes the services available downstream to tenants via a 
bundled fixed-term lease agreement for building space.  The Layer 3 building owner has 
sufficient certainty to enter into the contractual commitment with the Layer 2 provider, who 
now has sufficient assurances to invest in infrastructure, and consequently CityLink has the 
necessary certainty of cost recovery to lay the fibre to the building.  By a combination of 
relationship-specific investments and contractual commitments, the risks of asset stranding 
have been reduced to the extent that dark fibre provision is financially viable.  
 
4.2.2  Using a 19
th Century Business Model for Network Expansion  
It is noted that the mix of contractual and relationship-specific investment arrangements under 
which CityLink has expanded its networks bears a remarkable similarity to the manner in 
which Post Office telephony services were deployed widely across New Zealand in the period 
from 1880 to around 1920 (Howell & Sangekar, 2009).  Apart from those services deemed 
essential to service government and some business needs, new services were deployed in the   -21-   
predominantly rural New Zealand  of the time  using a „political petitioning‟ process.  To 
acquire  a  telephone  connection,  groups  of  at  least  five  „reputable  people‟  had  to  receive 
permission from the Governor in Council (a political process) to be allowed to pay the Post 
Office the full costs of laying wires and other ancillary equipment (including exchanges in 
some cases) to connect them to the telephony network (credible customer commitment by 
way of investment in relationship-specific assets).  Moreover, successful petitioners were also 
required to enter into agreements with the Post Office to pay the full costs of providing 
ongoing  services  on  those  assets  for  an  extended  period  of  time.    Failure  to  make  the 
government-mandated  monthly  payments  as  agreed  resulted  in  the  customer-funded  
infrastructure assets being confiscated by the Post Office (equivalent of „stranding‟ if the 
customer  failed  to  continue  purchasing  a  month-by-month  connection  service  –  i.e. 
„defected‟).  
 
The same model also applied to the deployment of electricity lines networks.  An electricity 
connection to a house (akin to Layer 1 dark fibre provision) would generate the lines firm an 
ongoing  income  only  if  the  customer  had  made  relationship-specific  investments  in 
appliances  (e.g.  lights,  cooker,  water  heater)  that  used  the  electricity  (akin  to  Layer  2 
investments).  Relatively, these assets were very large household investments at the time. If 
the customer ceased purchasing services (connection) from the lines company (e.g. reverted 
to using candles or the coal range), the expensive appliance investments were „stranded‟.  
Hence  purchase  of  appliances  provided  a  credible  signal  of  the  consumer‟s  intention  to 
purchase  electricity  lines  services  (and  indeed,  the  Layer  2-equivalent  electricity  from  a 
generator/retail firm) for a meaningful period.  Such credible consumer commitments gave 
sufficient assurances to both lines companies and generators of the likelihood of recovering 
costs to make their large fixed and sunk cost investments (indeed, in the typical model at the 
time, there was full vertical integration by providers in to all of appliance retail, electricity 
retail, generation and lines provision – Evans & Meade, 2009).  
 
The „problem‟ with such historic business models in a 21
st century broadband world is that 
technological convergence means that it has become much harder to bind end consumers to 
the ongoing purchase of services by their own potential investments in assets that become 
stranded by defection to alternative network providers.  The same computer/smartphone and 
attendant applications will work identically regardless of whether the broadband message 
comes via an ADSL modem, a cable modem, a Wi-Fi signal or a mobile „dongle‟.  The 
technology-specific  modems  and  dongles  are  very  low-cost,  and  every  computer  and 
smartphone  now  comes  with  an  embedded  WiFi  capability.  Indeed,  intense  competition 
amongst  infrastructure  providers  means  that  in  most  instances,  the  modem  or  dongle  is   -22-   
effectively given away by the Layer 3 retailer (who may even have received it at no cost from 
the Layer 2 infrastructure provider) in order to induce consumer switching to a different 
network  (albeit  with  sometimes  an  attendant  commitment  to  purchase  the  service  for  a 
minimum period – often 12 months).  Indeed, such practices have been heralded as one of the 
innovation „successes‟ of opening up competition in the telecommunications markets. But the 
consequence has been to raise the risks for separated Layer 1 and 2 investors, leading to the 
investment hold-up problems evidenced earlier in this paper. 
 
4.3  Generalisability of the CityLink Model 
The  CityLink  business  model  addresses  the  shortcomings  of  an  access-regulated  and 
mandatorially-separated  broadband  network  infrastructure  market  model  by  utilising  a 
„partnership‟ model that replicates a vertically integrated production chain by the judicious 
use of contracts and relationship-specific investments.  However, the partnership chain does 
not stop at the point of the Layer 3 retailer, as presumed by regulated telecommunications 
market models.  In the CityLink model, the end customer is embedded into the partnership as 
surely as any Layer 2 or 3 operator.  Whilst the customer could defect, it is in the interests of 
his Layer 2 or 3 provider to use contractual instruments to prevent this from happening („lock 
in the customer‟).  The Layer 2 provider is „locked in‟ by relationship-specific investments.  
In essence, this model reflects the „partnership‟ approach that characterises within-firm or 
within-partnership provision of computer technology services.  The „end consumer‟ is bound 
to use the „in-house‟ services (i.e. not defect) by virtue of membership of the firm/partnership.  
Indeed,  there  may  be  institutional  provisions  that  prevent  external  purchase.    These 
arrangements align the incentives for all concerned to justify the investments, because  of 
either common ownership of the investing entity (the end consumer is a part of the institution) 
or common overarching objective functions aligning the interests of all parties.  
 
Whilst  successful  amongst  the  customer  market  that  has  been  targeted  by  the  CityLink 
partnership, it is debatable whether the CityLink business model can be translated easily into 
mass-market  public  utility  dark  fibre  broadband  infrastructure  provision  under  explicit 
separation mandates.  Without the ability to lock end consumers into a meaningful or credible 
commitment to purchase fibre broadband services and not defect to other infrastructures, it 
seems likely that risks of asset stranding will militate against the provision of private sector 
funds for dark fibre network deployment.  To replicate the alignment of interests that arguably 
still attends separated electricity infrastructure provision, in the absence of appliances or other 
relationship-specific assets that lock the end consumer into the purchase of a specific form of 
broadband provision, the end consumer must be locked in by some other instrument, such as   -23-   
contracts that guarantee the recovery of investments or ownership of a key component of the 
network (e.g. the by the capital  outlay for the connection of a premise to the network passing 
down the street).   
 
In  the  first  instance,  commitments  in  the  form  of  customer  ownership  of  key  network 
components will likely be made only if the benefit to the consumer from both the capital 
expenditure and the use of fibre broadband exceeds the capital sum expended.  In the face of 
competition from alternative networks which do not necessitate customers committing large 
sums  in  advance  for  access  to  services,  it  would  appear  that  fibre  broadband  network 
providers face substantial hurdles in the pursuit of customers, especially in the residential 
mass market.  For example, even though CityLink provides substantial quantities of fibre 
around suburban Wellington (notably to Newtown, Kelburn and Miramar), and although the 
company is open to the possibility of connecting residential consumers whose properties the 
fibre passes, there is negligible interest in such services, given that under the CityLink model, 
such consumers would be bound to either invest in assets or enter into a long-term purchase 
commitment.    This  finding  is  unsurprising,  given  that  an  alternate  provider  (specifically 
TelstraClear cable) offers very high speed broadband services  (DOCSIS 3.0) in the same 
streets Citylink also passes, with no substantial up-front investment required, and even gives 
away the modem in order to attract custom.  Citylink‟s offer would appeal only to a very 
small  number  of  current  broadband  consumers  with  specific  requirements  for  product 
characteristics only available using dark fibre. Most of these (typically business customers)  
have already purchased services from the firm.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
In summary, therefore, the CityLink case study serves as a warning to policy-makers seeking 
to  encourage the  deployment of  dark  fibre  based public  broadband  networks  to  carefully 
consider the implications of both access regulations and separation mandates before imposing 
them  on  nascent  networks.    Without  flexibility  to  adapt  to  the  different  investment 
requirements  of  new  networks,  such  legacy  instruments  may  chill  investment  incentives 
before the networks have even been deployed.  If the desire is to truly encourage the creation 
of a „dumb core‟, „smart fringe‟ environment as espoused by the computer-centric internet 
community, then the institutions – the contracts and structures – which have been successfully 
deployed  by  firms  emerging  from  that  environment  may  offer  a  better  model  than those 
whose legacy derives from the models more familiar to those who have historically been 
charged with telecommunications regulation and policy-making.    -24-   
References 
Amendola, G., & Pupillo, L. (2008). The economics of Next Generation Access networks and 
regulatory governance: towards geographic patterns of regulation.   Communications 
and Strategies Special Issue November 2008: 85-105.  
Atkinson, R. (2008). Market structure for ultrabroadband. Communications and Strategies 
Special Issue November 2008: 35-49.  
Brownlee, N. (1998). Internet pricing in practice.  Chapter 3 in McKnight, L., & Bailey, J. 
(eds), Internet economics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.   
Cadman,  R.  (2010).  Means  not  ends:  deterring  discrimination  through  equivalence  and 
functional separation.  Telecommunications Policy 34(7): 366-74. 
Carlton,  D.,  &  Perloff,  J.  (2005).  Modern  Industrial  Organization.  4
th  Edition.  Boston, 
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.  
Cave,  M.  (2006).  Six  Degrees  of  Separation:  Operational  Separation  as  a  Remedy  in 
European  Telecommunications  Regulation.  Communications  and  Strategies,  64,  89-
103. 
Coase, R. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4 (16), 386–405. 
Crandall,  R.,  &  Waverman,  L.,  (2006),  The  failure  of  competitive  entry  into  fixed-line 
telecommunications:  who  is  at  fault?  Journal  of  Competition  Law  and  Economics 
2(1):113-48.  
de Bijl, P. (2005). Structural separation and access in telecommunications markets. Journal of 
Network industries 6(2): 95-114.  
Economides,  N.  (2008).  “Net  neutrality”,  non-discrimination  and  digital  distribution  of 
content through the internet.  I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information 
Society 4(2): 209-33. 
European Commission (2009). Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directives amending Directives 2002/32/EC 
on  a  common  regulatory  framework  for  electronic  communications  networks  and 
services, 2002/19/EC on access to , and interconnection of, electronic communications 
networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic 
communications networks and services .  Official Journal of the European Union L 
337/37.  
Evans, L., & Guthrie, G. (2006). Incentive regulation of prices when costs are sunk. Journal 
of Regulatory Economics 29(3): 239-64.  
Evans, L., & Hahn, R. (2010).  Regulating dynamic markets: progress in theory and practice. 
Wellington,  New  Zealand:  ISCR  working  paper.  Available  on 
http://www.iscr.org.nz/f574,16477/16477_Regulating_dynamic_markets_510_v11_Ma
y_28_2010.pdf  
Evans, L., & Meade, R. (2005). Alternating currents or counter-revolutions: contemporary 
electricity reform in New Zealand. Wellington, New Zealand: Victoria University Press.  
Gonçalves, R., & Nascimento, A. (2010). The momentum for network separation: a guide for 
regulators.  Telecommunications Policy 34(7): 355-83.  
Grajek,  M.,  &  Roller,  L-H.,  (2009),  Regulation  and  investment  in  network  industries: 
evidence  from  European  telecoms,  ESMT  Working  Paper  09-004,  available  from 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448666 . 
Guthrie, G. (2006). Regulating infrastructure: The impact on risk and investment. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 44(4), 925-972. 
Heatley,  D.,  &  Howell,  B.  (2010).  Price  discrimination,  structural  separation  and  the 
diffusion of fibre broadband: policy implications for Australia and New Zealand.  Paper 
presented  at  the  1
st  Asia-Pacific  Regional  Conference  of  the  International 
Telecommunications Society, August 26-28, Wellington, New Zealand.  
Hellwig, M. (2008) Competition policy and sector-specific regulation for network industries, 
Max Planck Institute Collective Goods Preprint 2008/29; 
Howell, B. (2010).  Politics and the pursuit of telecommunications sector efficiency.  Journal 
of Competition Law and Economics 6(2): 253-76.    -25-   
Howell,  B.  (2009).    Separating  New  Zealand’s  incumbent  provider:  a  political  economy 
analysis.  Paper presented at the International Telecommunications Society Regional 
Conference,  Perth,  Australia,  August  18  2009.    Available  on 
http://www.iscr.org.nz/f503,14751/14751_Political_Economy_of_Separation_BHowell
_April09.pdf  
Howell, B. (2007). A pendulous progression: New Zealand’s telecommunications regulation 
1987-2007.  Wellington,  New  Zealand:  ISCR  working  paper.    Available  on 
http://www.iscr.org.nz/f378,10548/10548_Pendulous_Progress_v_4_12_Nov.pdf . 
Howell,  B.  (2006).  An  institutional  economics  analysis  of  regulatory  institutions  in  the 




Howell, B., & Grimes, A. (2010).  Productivity questions for public sector fast fibre network 
financiers.  Communications and Strategies 78: 127-45.  
Howell,  B.,  Meade,  R.  &  O‟Connor,  S.  (2010).  Structural  separation  versus  vertical 
integration:  lessons  for  telecommunications  from  electricity  reforms. 
Telecommunications Policy 34(7): 392-402.  
Howell, B., & Sangekar, M. (2009). Beyond surface similarities: telecommunications industry 
structure evolution in Finland and New Zealand.  Prometheus 27(2): 99-115.  
Huigen,  J.,  &  Cave,  M.  (2008).  Regulation  and  the  promotion  of  investment  in  next 
generation networks: a European dilemma.  Telecommunications Policy 32(11): 713-21.  
Lebourges, M. (2010).  Competition  via investment, an  efficient  model  for  FTTH rollout. 
Communications and Strategies 78: 45-68. 
Ida, T., & Sakahira, K. (2008). Broadband migration and lock-in effects: mixed logit model 
analysis  of  Japan‟s  high-speed  internet  access  service.  Telecommunications  Policy 
32(9-10): 615-25.  
Marcus,  J.,  &  Elixmann,  D.  (2008).  Regulatory  approaches  to  NGNs:  an  international 
comparison. Communications and Strategies 69: 19-40. 
Meade, R. (2010). Vertical integration vs vertical separation in an imperfectly competitive 
industry, such as electricity, with retail, wholesale and forward markets. Wellington, 
New  Zealand:  ISCR  working  paper.    Available  on 
http://www.iscr.org.nz/f600,17093/17093_Meade_VI_vs_VS_Paper_ex_Memoire_050
710.pdf  
Meade,  R.,  &  O‟Connor,  S.  (2009).  Comparison  of  long-term  contracts  and  vertical 
integration  in  decentralised  electricity  markets.  Paper  presented  at  the  workshop 
“Efficiency, Competition and long term Contracts in Electricity Markets”, Florence, 
Italy 15-16 January 2009.  
 Available  on  http://www.iscr.org.nz/f487,14259/14259_Comparison_of_Long-
Term_Contracts_and_Vertical_Integration.pdf  
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1992). Economics, Organization and Management. Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.  
 OECD (2009).  Communications Outlook 2009.  Available from http://www.oecd.org .  
Preissl,  B.,  &  Whalley,  J.  (2008).  The  challenges  and  opportunities  of  Next  Generation 
Networks. Communications and Strategies 69: 9-16.  
Rey, P., & Tirole, J. (2007). A primer on foreclosure.  In M. Armstrong and R. Porter (Eds.), 
Handbook of industrial organization (pp 2145-220). Amsterdam: Elsevier.  
Soria, B., & Hernandez-Gil, F. (2010). Do NGAN economics allow for network competition. 
Communications and Strategies 78: 23-44.  
Van Gorp, A., & Middleton, C. (2010). Fiber to the home unbundling and retail competition: 
developments in the Netherlands. Communications and Strategies 78: 87-106.  
Wallsten,  S.,  (2006),  Broadband  and  unbundling  regulations  in  OECD  countries,  AEI 
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Working Paper 06-16.   
Williamson,  O.  (1985).    Economic  institutions  of  capitalism:  firms,  markets,  relational 
contracting. London: Collier McMillan.    -26-   
Xavier, P. & Ypsilanti, D. (2004). Is the Case for Structural Separation of the Local Loop 
Persuasive? Journal of Policy, Regulation and Strategy for Telecommunications, 6, 74-
92.  
Zimmermann, H. (1980). OSI Reference Mode – The ISO Model of Architecture for Open 
Systems Interconnect. IEEE Transactions on Communications. 28 4. April. 425-432. 
 